The emotions displayed by others can be cues to predict their behavior. Happy expressions are usually linked to positive consequences whereas angry faces are associated with probable negative outcomes. However, there are situations in which the expectations we generate do not hold. Here, control mechanisms must be put in place. We designed an interpersonal game in which participants received good or bad economic offers from several partners. A cue indicated whether the emotion of their partner could be trusted or not. Trustworthy partners with happy facial expressions were cooperative and angry partners did not cooperate.
Every day we experience different emotions, and also perceive various emotional expressions in people around us. Such emotions prioritize goals, signal the relevance of events, and also prepare us to respond (see Frijda, 1986; Villeumier, 2005; Pessoa, 2009) . We also use them to predict what is going on in other people's minds (Frith & Frith, 2006) therefore they play an essential role in social interactions (Manstead, 1991; Olsson & Ochsner 2008) . Evolutionary theory suggests that humans have learned to associate different emotions with specific meanings (Darwin, 1872) . For example, previous research relates happiness expressions with signals of cooperative intents (Fridlund, 1995) and trust (Eckel & Wilson, 2003) . However, the effects that emotions generate in our behavior sometimes have to be controlled to meet the goals set by the current situation. In the present study, we employed electrophysiological recordings to investigate the stages of information processing at which executive attention mechanisms modulate emotional processing in social contexts.
Facial displays of emotions are analyzed through fast and many times implicit neural pathways (Villeumier & Pourtois, 2007) . Research shows that emotional processing can be modulated by several factors, which include attention and context. Many reports suggest that spatial attention enhances emotional processing (e.g. Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander & Vuilleumier, 2004) . Other studies have shown that situational context (e.g. the emotional valence of background images, or the meaning conveyed by stories accompanying facial expressions) often bias the ascription of facial displays to different emotional categories (e.g. Carroll & Russell, 1996; Righart & de Gelder, 2006) . Regarding task context, emotional incongruent stimuli generate interference in Stroop (Whalen et al., 1998) or flanker-type paradigms (Egner, Etkin, Gale & Hirsch, 2008; Ochsner, Hughes, Robertson, Cooper & Gabrieli, 2009) . In these cases, control mechanisms come into play to adjust behavioural responses to task demands (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist & Ochsner, 2008) .
Executive attention, which mediates stimulus and response conflict, as well as other forms of mental effort linked to cognitive control (e.g. Posner & Rothbart, 1998) .When different dimensions of a situation lead to opposite action tendencies, conflict arises and executive attention mechanisms bias processing to favor goal-relevant processes at the expense of irrelevant information. The need of control is also present in social interactions (see Zaki, Hennigan, Weber & Ochsner, 2010) . People may need to control and/or camouflage their own emotional expressions, or they may learn that the emotional displays of some people cannot be taken as indicative of their future actions. In certain contexts, untrustworthy people (Todorov, Baron & Oosterhof, 2008) Little is known about the temporal dynamics and stages of processing at which executive attention and emotion processing intersect. To study this, we employed the paradigm of Ruz & Tudela (2011) in which participants had to accept or reject divisions of money that different partners proposed to them. They were asked to use the emotions conveyed by their partners to anticipate their most likely behavior, which was either a good or bad economic offer. However, there were two different types of partners. The emotional expressions of trustworthy partners predicted their default or 'natural' consequences (i.e. happy expressions predicted good offers and angry expressions predicted bad ones) whereas the opposite happened for untrustworthy partners (i.e. happy expressions predicted bad offers whereas angry expressions predicted good ones). Based on previous studies that suggest that happy expressions generate initial trust and cooperative tendencies (Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001 ) and angry ones signal threat and lead to avoidance tendencies (Marsh, Ambady and Kleck, 2005) , we hypothesized that untrustworthy partners would generate conflict (reflected in more errors and slower response times -RT-in behavioral indexes) and call for executive mechanisms, given that they required a response contrary to the natural tendencies that emotions generate (see Ruz & Tudela, 2011) .
We focused our analyses on electrophysiological potentials that have been linked to emotion processing and attention by previous research. By 120 ms, the brain already differentiates emotional from neutral facial displays (see Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007) . This effect, observed in the fronto-central N1, is thought to reflect the fast extraction of the affective meaning of stimuli through coarse visual cues (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003) .
With a similar timing, the posterior P1 potential is often enhanced by increased attention to negative and also positive stimuli compared to neutral material (Brosch, Sander, Pourtois, & Scherer, 2008) . As these two potentials reflect initial stages of emotional processing, if executive attention modulates emotion in a social context from an early point in time, we expected increased amplitudes of the N1 and/or P1 for untrustworthy compared to trustworthy partners.
Two negativities that appear from 200 to 300 ms in centro-medial and frontal channels were also of interest to our study. The amplitude of the N2 is usually more negative for high than for low-conflict stimuli (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008) . Hence, we expected that untrustworthy partners would generate an N2 of larger amplitude than trustworthy ones. On the other hand, the N300 has been linked to the affective evaluation of stimuli (Carretié & Iglesias, 1995; Rossignol, Philippot, Douilliez, Crommelinck & Campanella, 2005) . This potential is supposed to reflect the depth of emotional processing, or the affective significance of stimuli rather than their physical characteristics. Our manipulation of trustworthiness was meant to modify the meaning of the emotional facial expressions, and with this the emotional value attributed to the happy and angry facial displays of the game partners. Thus, we expected that the typical pattern of a heightened N300 for angry facial expressions (e.g. Schutter, Haan & van Honk, 2004) would be observable in the trustworthy condition but absent for untrustworthy partners, which would lead to an interaction on this potential between the displayed emotions and their trustworthiness.
Finally, the P300 is also often modulated by the emotional and/or arousing content of stimuli.
Several studies employing emotional facial expressions and affective pictures have shown that the amplitude of this slow positive wave is enhanced when participants view emotional compared to neutral material (e.g. Carretié, Iglesias, García & Ballesteros, 1997; Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike & Hamm, 2004) , and this modulation is stronger for highly arousing stimuli (e.g. Cacioppo, Crites, Berntson, & Coles, 1993) . Emotional stimuli capture attention and receive increased resources, which facilitate their processing compared to neutral material, and such facilitation seems to relate to the modulation in the P300 (e.g. Rossignol et al., 2005) .
In addition, in domains separate from research on emotion, this potential is thought to reflect a cascade of attentional and also mnemonic processes. Results mostly coincide in that the amplitude of the P300 reflects the amount of resources available to perform the task; the more resources, the larger its amplitude (see Polich, 2007) . Therefore, whereas we did not expect differences on the P300 depending on the emotional expression of the partners, we hypothesized that its amplitude would be smaller for untrustworthy partners, as responding to them was more demanding.
To summarize, with the aim of studying the stages of information processing at which executive attention modulates perceived emotion in a social context, we analyzed the effect of these two factors in several electrophysiological potentials related to attention and/or emotional processing.
METHODS

Participants
Twenty-four right-handed healthy participants (average 20.7 years old, 6 men) were recruited from the University of Granada. They all signed a consent form approved by the local Ethics Committee and received course credits and a chocolate token in exchange for their participation.
Stimuli and procedure
Participants played a game with several different partners represented by pictures on the computer screen, who proposed them good or bad economic offers. They were told that the offers were taken from the responses of participants who completed standardized questionnaires related to social situations and trustworthiness. Their goal was to sum more money than all of their partners together, and if they won this game they would receive a chocolate token as a reward. Half of these offers would be beneficial to them ('good offers'), in the sense that they received more money than the partner, and the other half would be beneficial to the partners ('bad offers'), because they received less money than the partner. If participants accepted the offer, they would keep their share of the division and their partner would take the other amount. If they rejected it instead, no amount would be added to any account for that trial. Thus, the best strategy to win the game was to accept the good offers and reject the bad ones; participants were told so, although they were not instructed to always reject bad offers.
For each of the partners, we provided information regarding how trustworthy they were by means of a cue presented at the beginning of every trial. For trustworthy partners, a smile would mean that most likely the offer would be good, and an angry expression would predict a probable bad offer. Untrustworthy partners, on the other hand, would smile in anticipation of bad offers and would have an angry expression before a probable good offer. Participants had to use the information provided by the cue together with the emotion displayed by their partner to accept or reject the offers before they were presented. The offer was presented afterwards (see Figure 1 for a display of the sequence of the events in a trial). In addition, participants were asked to respond to their partner as fast as possible; they were told that if they took too long (more than 1.5 secs), the highest amount in the offer would be added to their partner's account.
The cues were triangular and squared black shapes (counterbalanced across participants). One hundred and sixty faces from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (Lundqvist et al. 1998 ; 50% female), displaying happy or angry (50%) facial expressions, were used as partners who offered the participants a split of a sum of money. There were 32 different offers, displayed as a green and a blue number (from 1 to 9) separated by a slash symbol. The difference between the two numbers was always 1. The left-right location of the highest number and the colors were matched across trials. The participants were assigned the amount coded in one color and the partners the other number/amount (counterbalanced across participants). In half of the trials, the highest number was displayed in the color that corresponded to the participant and in the other half in the partner's color. This manipulation was orthogonal to the emotion displayed by the partners and to the cue. The predictions of the cue and the emotional expression of the target were valid in 80% of the trials. That is, offers were good to the participants in 80% of the trials in which a trustworthy partner smiled or an untrustworthy partner had an angry expression, and they were bad in 80% of the trials in which a trustworthy partner had an angry expression or an untrustworthy partner smiled.
All stimuli were presented centrally in a 17-inch monitor controlled by Biological E-prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) . Each trial comprised the following events (see Figure 1 ), all displayed in a grey background. The cue (2.5 o x2. an excessively noisy EEG (±100 µV from one sample to the next) and eye-movements artifacts (blinks or saccades: ±70µV on EOG channels) were eliminated from the analyses. Data from individual channels that were consistently bad for a specific subject (>20% of trials) were replaced using a spherical interpolation algorithm (Perrin, Pernier, Bertrand, & Echallier, 1989) .
Finally, we established a minimum criterion of 30 artifact-free trials per subject and condition to maintain an acceptable signal-to-noise ratio.
Four group-averaged ERP waveforms were constructed according to the trustworthiness of the partners (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and their emotional expression (happy vs. angry).
ERP were re-referenced to the average, and the 200-ms pre-stimulus epoch served as baseline.
Trials that did not meet the behavioral requirements (see below) were not included in the ERP averages.
As a first step, the averaged files were submitted to a segmentation analysis performed with the correlation between different maps should not be lower than 92%) and computes the average map for each of these stable periods. Stable maps are thought to represent computational stages of information processing. Differences between maps indicate differences in the underlying brain sources (Lehmann, 1987) . Variations in the amplitude of the signal between conditions do not affect results because data are normalized before comparisons. The number of maps that best explains the whole group-averaged data set is defined by a cross-validation criterion (Pascual-Marqui, Michel, & Lehmann, 1995 ).
Afterwards, we tested for differences in the amplitude of the ERP across the four task conditions. We focused on the target-locked ERP given that previous functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) analyses using the same paradigm (Ruz & Tudela, 2011) did not reveal any differences between trustworthy and untrustworthy cues at standard statistical thresholds.
Given their relevance in previous studies of emotion and attention, we analyzed the occipital P1, the fronto-medial N1, the fronto-central N2, N300 and the P300 potentials elicited by the face of the partners. For this, we selected sets of contiguous electrodes in anterior, centromedial and posterior regions of the scalp (see the distribution of selected channels in Figure 3 ), which on an initial visual inspection seemed to reflect task effects on the amplitude of the voltage of the potentials of interest. The hemisphere factor was not included, as visual inspection of the data did not indicate any differences on this direction. We then calculated the average amplitude on the selected electrodes across the three selected spatial windows of the scalp (anterior, medial and frontal). The latency of the peaks of the potentials of interest was used to define the temporal windows of the analyses, which were always within the time windows revealed by the segmentation process.
We used the same factors in the ANOVAS for the behavioral and ERP data. These were Control (trustworthy, untrustworthy) and Emotion (happy, angry). We only included trials in which the response of participants was useful to fulfill the goal of the game, and also those which were within 3 standard deviations from the mean RT. The average number of trials entered in the analyses was the following: 93 (trustworthy happy), 91 (trustworthy angry), 88 (untrustworthy happy) and 85 (untrustworthy angry). Only results that fulfill the p<0.05 significance criterion are reported.
Results
Behavioral
Participants' responses helped them to fulfill the goal of the game in 91.15% of the trials.
There were differences between the trustworthy (94%; SE=1.02) and the untrustworthy condition (86%; SE=2.24), F 1,23 =20.58, p<0.001. The effect of emotion was also significant F 1,23 =10.11, p<0.004 (angry 88% vs. happy 92%), but the interaction between executive attention and emotion was not (F<1). 
N2 and N300
The third topographical map contained the peaks of the N2 and N300 potentials, which had their respective maxima at 230 and 310 ms. We performed two different ANOVAs on the average amplitudes during a window of 32 ms surrounding each peak (16 ms on each side).
From 214 to 246 ms, encompassing the N2, there was an effect of emotion on this potential at centro-medial electrodes, F 1,23 =9.17, p<0.01, as it was more negative for happy (-0.29 µV; SE=0.2) than for angry faces (0.01 µV; SE=0.22). There was also a marginal effect of emotion at anterior locations, F1,23=3.96, p=0.058, again with a more negative deflection for happy (-1.96 µV; SE=0.32) than for angry faces (-1.71 µV; SE=0.35). All other contrasts during this temporal window were non-significant (all Fs<1).
From 294 to 326 ms, encompassing the N300, there was an emotion x executive attention interaction on this potential at centro-medial electrodes, F 1,23 =5.19, p<0.05 (Figure 4 ). This interaction was due to a emotion effect for trustworthy, F 1,23 =8.81, p<0.01 (angry -1.23 µV, SE=0.31 vs. happy -0.72 µV; SE=0.30), but not for untrustworthy faces, F<1. All other contrasts were non-significant (all Fs<1).
P300
From 376 to 476 ms there was an effect of attention at the centro-medial P300, F 1,23 =8.45, SE=0.40) than for untrustworthy partners (3.14 µV; SE=0.34). All other contrasts were nonsignificant (all Fs<1).
Discussion
The present study aimed at exploring the temporal dynamics and stages of information processing at which executive attention interacts with emotion in a social context. First, our results show that when the emotions of happiness and anger of partners in an economic game are not tied to their natural consequences, behavioral responses are slowed down. Second, ERP results indicate that in the present social context, attention mechanisms modulate processing from an early point in time, as reflected by modulations on the N1 potential, and interact with emotion analysis during the N300 time-window, before motor decision and execution stages indexed by the P300.
Our research manipulated the emotion displayed by the partner (see Van Kleef, de Dreu and Manstead, 2010) within a social context (Parkinson, 1996) . A few studies in the field of behavioural economic games show that social information can bias decision-making, especially under high levels of contextual uncertainty (Ruz, Moser & Webster, 2011) . These and other studies suggest that the emotions of happiness and anger by default lead to trust (cooperative) and distrust (competitive) behavior in this type of bargaining games (see Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2010) . In addition, our study introduces the factor of control over the meaning of emotions. Whereas for trustworthy partners happiness and anger were associated to their default consequences, this pattern was the opposite for untrustworthy partners, and thus participants had to adjust their responses accordingly. Admittedly, our use of the term "trustworthiness" does not fully overlap with the construct of trustworthiness as an inherent characteristic that leads people to either trust or distrust one another (e.g. Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008) . In the current case the trustworthiness of partners was an experimental manipulation, instructed to participants, and it was not linked to specific facial features (see Vrtičkaa, Andersson, Sander & Vuilleumier, 2008 , which used the terms "friend" and "foe" in a similar manipulation).
The behavioral results replicated previous studies (Ruz & Tudela, 2001) . Responses were faster and more accurate to partners whose emotions indicated their default consequences compared to untrustworthy partners, which relates to the need of executive attention (see Egner et al., 2008) . Responses to happy partners were faster than responses to angry people in the trustworthy condition, which could be related to avoidance tendencies associated to negative emotions (Marsh, Ambady and Kleck, 2005) . This difference, however, disappeared in the untrustworthy condition. The reasons for such interaction are unclear. It could be due to a ceiling effect in the untrustworthy condition, or perhaps to differences in affective evaluation across conditions (see related discussion on the pattern of results of the N300 potential).
Electrophysiological results showed that executive attention affected processing from an early point in time. The frontal N1 had larger amplitude for untrustworthy people. Such enhancement could be related to an initial amplification of relevant processing generated by top-down factors (Hillyard & Picton, 1987) . Untrustworthy partners were associated to higher processing demands (as indicated by behavioral data), and thus the N1 enhancement could be related to the allocation of more resources in this condition (e.g. Williams, et al., 2003) .
Although the poor spatial resolution of the EEG prevents us from drawing strong conclusions regarding the source of such modulations, the involvement of prefrontal regions would be plausible given that a previous experiment using a very similar paradigm in combination with fMRI showed higher activations in bilateral middle frontal cortices for the untrustworthy condition (Ruz & Tudela, 2011) . Thus, it could be the case that the more pronounced N1 indexed activation in those or similar areas from an early point in time. The fact that the facial displays of partners were preceded by cues could help explain the readily nature of these signals.
Emotion also modulated the amplitude of the N2 in centro-medial channels irrespective of its contextual meaning (see Kanske & Kotz, 2010) . We had predicted that the N200 would have larger amplitude in the untrustworthy condition, given that it entails a conflict between the natural expectations that emotions generate and their meaning in the game. Trustworthiness, however, did not modulate this potential. This null result may be taken as indication that the untrustworthy condition did not engage control mechanisms. Still, RT results show a marked slowing of responses in this situation. In addition, previous fMRI results (Ruz & Tudela, 2011) show that the ACC and bilateral frontal cortices were more active in this condition, which suggests that it actually triggered some form of conflict. The lack of effect on the N2, although puzzling, may be explained by differences between the current paradigm and previous emotional conflict (flanker) tasks. Further research will be needed to replicate these results and explain them in more detail.
As predicted, the N300 potential displayed an interaction between executive attention and emotion. Whereas there was no differentiation between happy and angry emotional expressions of untrustworthy partners, trustworthy angry partners generated a larger N300 than happy ones (see Schutter, Haan & van Honk, 2004) . This pattern fits nicely with previous reports relating the N300 with an emotional evaluation of stimuli (Carretié & Iglesias, 1995; Carretié et al., 1997; Rossignol et al., 2005) . In the current game, only trustworthy partners conveyed emotions that matched their natural effects. Thus, a normal emotional evaluation could only be performed in this condition, as reflected in N300 amplitude. Emotions displayed by untrustworthy partners, on the other hand, could not be integrated with the default evaluation associated to happy and angry expressions, and this could have led to a lack of differences in the affective processing indexed by this potential. Interestingly, the pattern of modulations in the N300 mimics the behavioral RT effects. This may suggest that the increased amplitude/RT for angry compared to happy partners in the trustworthy condition may be related to a deeper affective analysis of angry partners in that context (Carretié & Iglesias, 1995) , a difference that may dilute in the untrustworthy condition due to the mismatch between the default and context-dependent meaning. This, however, is only a working hypothesis which would need further testing.
Finally, the P300 was modulated only by the level of executive attention triggered by the partners. The lack of differences between emotions was predicted based on previous results (for a review, see Hajcak, MacNamara & Olvet, 2010) . Instead, the P300 modulation may indicate the availability of more resources in the untrustworthy condition (Polich, 2007) , which agrees with behavioral data. Differences between conditions in terms of arousal levels could also be affecting the amplitude of this potential (Carretié & Iglesias, 1995) . 
